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Neolin (the “Delaware Prophet”) and Tenskwatawa (the “Shawnee Prophet”) both 
claimed to carry a message from the Creator that, if heeded, would allow American 
Indians to return to the golden age in which they lived before European contact.  Though 
the messages were similar, each used different methods to pursue his primary goal—life 
free from European influence.  Both Neolin and Tenskwatawa were associated with 
powerful chiefs—Pontiac and Tecumseh, respectively—who orchestrated pan-Indian 
movements in support of the prophets’ goals.  Historically, European military leaders, 
regardless of their personal beliefs, have used religious figureheads as justification for 
radical actions—the unification of the sacred and the mundane lends itself to winning 
support from the populace.  Perhaps it is because of this knowledge that many white 
historians studying American Indian affairs—especially pre-1970 historians, who wrote 
almost exclusively from the perspective of white society—have assumed that Indian 
military leaders had a similar relationship with religious leaders.  Many take for granted 
that Pontiac and Tecumseh merely used Neolin and Tenskwatawa to gain support for 
their own causes.  By using these two prophets as case studies, this paper seeks to 
demonstrate the essential interconnectedness of religion and politics in such nativist 
movements.  Neither the prophets nor the chiefs were the sole leaders of the two 
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movements; rather, each added his power to a movement in order to achieve a common 
goal—freedom from the oppression of white society. 
The cultural upheaval among Native Americans that accompanied European 
contact and expansion created an ideal environment for prophets.  Prophets appeared in 
Native American societies long before Europeans; however, as the traditional lifestyle 
deteriorated under the pressure of European expansion, numerous prophets appeared 
promising a return of the golden age if only Native Americans would reject European 
culture.  Some prophets went so far as to suggest driving Europeans out of America.  
Such nativist ideas drew many like-minded people from surrounding tribes.  At times a 
prophet’s message blended with a militaristic movement that challenged the authority of 
the white government in the area. 1
Neolin and Tenskwatawa were two such prophets.  Neolin, a man of the Delaware 
(or Lenape) tribe, claimed to have received a vision from the creator in 1760. His ideas 
fueled a nativism movement later dubbed “Pontiac’s Conspiracy”.  Pontiac, a chief of the 
Ottawa, did not create the movement (which came into being thanks to the initiative of 
other tribes who followed Pontiac’s example) but, along with Neolin, became a leader 
and figurehead.  Tenskwatawa, a Shawnee, claimed to have received his vision in 1805.  
His message became the ideology for a pan-Indian nativism movement led by himself 
and his brother, Tecumseh.  Each military leader worked in cooperation with his 
respective religious leader, neither one completely dominating the movement.  None of 
these men single-handedly created a movement; rather, they drew upon ideas and 
sentiments that already existed in Native American culture.   
 
                                               
1 For more information on cultural conditions that led to the rise of prophets, see Bernard Barber, 
“Acculturation and Messianic Movements,” American Sociological Review 6 (1941): 663-669.  
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The largest barrier to an examination of Neolin and Tenskwatawa is the nature of 
the sources available.  Secondary sources—monographs and journal articles written by 
historians—vary widely in their attitudes regarding American Indians depending on when 
they were written.  The opinions of the author color the interpretation of primary sources, 
creating significantly different histories from the same material.  As to the primary 
sources themselves, accounts of the prophets or of Pontiac and Tecumseh were nearly all 
recorded by white men, mainly missionaries, traders, or members of the military.  The 
authors of the accounts, therefore, saw events and people through a cultural filter.  White 
men regarded American Indians as savages, and evaluated them using white cultural 
standards—thus praising those who were best adapted to white society and criticizing 
those who clung to tradition.  Missionaries saw American Indians as heathens.  Accounts 
of American Indian religion were given through an understanding of Christianity, with a 
dichotomized concept of good and evil, emphasized ideas that reflected Christian ideas 
such as God, and were critical of anything that did not conform to Christian ideals.  
Specific examples of this as well as the attitudes of historians toward American Indians 
will be addressed as they arise. 
An understanding of Neolin’s objection to European culture necessitates a 
discussion of European influence on American Indian society over time.  The Delaware 
first came into contact with Europeans—Dutch fur traders—in the early 17th century.  
The trade that resulted between the two cultures gradually created a dependency—the 
ability of the Delaware to provide for themselves decreased as skills that were no longer 
necessary failed to pass to the next generation, and they relied increasingly on trade with 
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Europeans for sustenance.  The introduction of alcohol and new diseases created social 
instability (Neolin, recognizing this, would later oppose the consumption of alchohol).2   
Further social instability resulted as interaction between the two cultures 
increased.  In the latter part of the 17th century, the burgeoning fur trade—pursued by 
Europeans and Native Americans alike, and aided by the use of firearms—created such a 
scarcity of game that the Delaware began to move north and west, away from their 
original land in eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and southeastern New York.3  
France’s desire to control more land contributed to this dislocation.  The Walking 
Purchase of 1737, dictated by James Logan, stated that the Delaware would sell Logan an 
amount of land, the western border of which would be measured as the distance a man 
could walk in a day and a half.  Logan hired trained men who traveled about fifty-five 
miles in this time, whereas an average man could only have walked twenty or thirty.  All 
told, Logan ended up with 1200 square miles of land.  To prevent further such incidents, 
the Iroquois, who held some control over the Delaware, banished the tribe.4  The 
migrating bands found places to settle in the Pennsylvania area, but did so in broken 
social patterns.5  Thus, the scattering that resulted from the forced migration demoralized 
the Delaware and destroyed much of their culture, leaving them extremely receptive to 
new ideas, including those of both prophets and Christian missionaries. 
The mid-eighteenth century was tumultuous for many Native American tribes 
living in or near Canada, including the Delaware and the Ottawa.  Between 1755 and 
                                               
2 Charles E. Hunter, “The Delaware Nativist Revival of the Mid-Eighteenth Century.” Ethnohistory 18 
(1971), 39-40. 
3 Ibid., 40. 
4 Russell Bourne, Gods of War, Gods of Peace: How the Meeting of Native and Colonial Religions Shaped 
Early America (New York and San Diego: Harcourt, Inc.), 198-200. 
5 Alfred A. Cave, “The Delaware Prophet Neolin: A Reappraisal,” Ethnohistory 46 (1999), 268. 
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1760 two great powers, France and Britain, contested for control in what is known in 
North America as the French and Indian War and in Europe as the Seven Years’ War.  
Thanks to an elaborate alliance system, most of Europe joined the struggle—Austria, 
Russia, Poland, Sweden, and Saxony aided France, while Prussia and Hanover aided 
Britain.6  Some American Indian tribes chose sides, while others simply found 
themselves caught in the midst of numerous opposing forces.  The Ottawa and the 
Delaware fought on the side of the French; however, they felt that the French did not 
sufficiently support their war effort and eventually peacefully accepted British rule before 
Britain’s victory became evident when France surrendered Quebec in September 1759.7   
Howard Peckham addresses this change of allegiance in his 1947 monograph 
Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (which was the first to thoroughly study Pontiac since 
that of Francis Parkman, who wrote the earliest complete history of Pontiac’s movement 
in The Conspiracy of Pontiac, first published in 1851).  Peckham contended that the 
American Indians changed their support from the French to the British as the war turned 
in favor of the latter, because “It was ever an Indian characteristic to favor the side that 
was successful.”8  It is possible that this was a reason behind the change; however, 
Peckham frequently assigns such stereotypical traits to Native Americans without any 
documentary evidence whatsoever, so his position is questionable.  Nevertheless, 
Peckham thoroughly researched all sources available as of 1947, both historical and 
anthropological, for his scholarly study on the life and times of Pontiac (sources such as 
journals and letters belonging to British officers present during Pontiac’s war).  Although 
he treated Neolin with scorn, his account of the military aspects of the war—troop 
                                               
6 Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994), 40. 
7 Cave, “The Delaware Prophet Neolin,” 270. 
8 Peckham, 52 
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movements, attacks on forts, etc.—is straightforward, relying on facts collected from 
primary sources rather than on Peckham’s opinion.  Having access to papers that 
Parkman did not (such as the recently released papers of General Thomas Gage, Lord 
Jeffrey Amherst, Robert Rogers, and manuscripts from the Clements and Burton 
collections) gave Peckham a distinct advantage over his predecessor.  Once one takes his 
racial bias into consideration, therefore, his narrative is useful as a single source that 
provides countless important details regarding the events of the war. 
Neolin railed against social problems under British control; however, in order to 
understand these problems, one must understand society during the alliance with France.  
While the French dominated Canada, their relationship with the Native population was 
based on diplomacy and economics.  Gift exchanges had long been a traditional means of 
maintaining reciprocal relationships among Native American tribes.9  The French 
governor of Canada, known by the title “Onontio,” played the role of “father” to the 
Native “children,” providing for them by giving gifts of supplies: guns, ammunition, 
tools, cloth, etc.  According to Richard White (whose 1991 monograph The Middle 
Ground approached the conflict between the Great Lakes tribes and European culture by 
examining it as a blend of two societies, both of which experienced change thanks to the 
other), “none of the French governors who led the alliance [between the French and the 
American Indians] was regarded as a conquerer [sic].  Instead, western Indians regarded 
Onontio and the Frenchmen who followed him as their allies, protectors, suppliers, and as 
the mediators of their disputes.”10 Thus, whereas a European monarch would collect taxes 
from his subjects, Onontio, as a father, was expected to give his “children” gifts and 
                                               
9 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-
1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15. 
10 Ibid., 36. 
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supplies.  For the most part, French governors understood this expectation.  Governor de 
Beauharnois attempted to explain this to the French court in 1730: “all the nations of 
Canada regard the governor as their father, which in consequence, following their ideas, 
he ought at all times to give them what they need to feed themselves, clothe themselves, 
and to hunt.”11  The relationship between the French and the Great Lakes tribes, 
therefore, was reciprocal—the father had to “support” his children, and so long as he did, 
the children consented to “obey” their father.  The nations of Canada benefited from this 
relationship not only materially but politically as well.  Disputes between tribes were 
once most readily settled by appealing to the ties of kinship.  These ties, however, were 
only effective over a certain distance—some tribes were too distantly related for even 
metaphorical kinship to be of any use.  By becoming Onontio’s children, however, the 
American Indian nations became more unified: Onontio had the symbolic authority, 
meaning the necessary kinship ties, to settle intertribal disputes.12 
By providing supplies to his children, Onontio not only maintained the diplomatic 
relationship between the two cultures, but also created a dependency—a fact that Neolin 
would later try to remedy by calling for a cessation of trade with Europeans.  The 
Ottawas and Hurons living near Fort Detroit relied on the French officers of the fort to 
supply things that they could not produce but no longer felt that they could or should live 
without.  For example, in 1761 Sir William Johnston, a British Indian agent (His 
Majesty’s Superintendent in the Northern Department) sent a list of goods desired by the 
Indian Americans near Detroit to General Jeffery Amherst (commander-in-chief of His 
Majesty’s Forces in North America).  This list included goods such as French blankets, 
                                               
11 Ibid., 180. 
12 Ibid., 40. 
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cotton clothing, needles and threads, knives, scissors, cookware, ammunition, traps, and 
rum.13  The Ottawas and Hurons, like many other tribes with access to European trade, 
saw such merchandise as a necessity at this time, even though their societies had existed 
for centuries without it.  While the French still ruled in Canada, Nicolas Perrot, a French 
trader, said to the Ottawa, “You have forgotten that your ancestors in former days used 
earthen pots, stone hatchets, and knives, and bows; and you will be obliged to use them 
again, if Onontio abandons you.  What will become of you, if he becomes angry?”14  
Ironically, Perrot later reversed his opinion, realizing that what he had interpreted as 
dependence was largely a behavior designed to garner the largest possible amount of 
goods from the French.  He wrote in his memoir (sometime between 1680 and 1718, not 
published until 1864) that, as the Hurons near Detroit, along with numerous other groups, 
preferred to bring their furs to sell to the British, who could offer better goods in trade, 
the Natives seemed to have the “arrogant notion that the French cannot get along without 
them and that we could not maintain ourselves in the colony without the assistance that 
they give us.”15  Thus, although American Indian communities relied on Europeans to 
provide things they could not make, and although they could not subsist without guns and 
ammunition in particular, they did not see themselves as completely powerless—they 
needed their father, but he needed them, as well. 
                                               
13 Peckham, 71. 
14 Claude Charles Le Roy, Bacqueville de la Potherie, History of the Savage Peoples Who are Allies of New 
France, in The Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes as Described 
by Nicolas Perrot, French Commandant in the Northwest; Bacqueville de la Potherie, French Royal 
Commissionner to Canada; Morrell Marston, American Army Officer; and Thomas Forsyth, United States 
agent at Fort Armstrong, trans. and ed. Emma Helen Blair, vol. 2 (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark 
Company, 1912), 77. 
15 Nicolas Perrot, Memoir on the Manners, Customs, and Religion of the Savages of North America (Paris, 
1864), in The Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes as Described by 
Nicolas Perrot, French Commandant in the Northwest; Bacqueville de la Potherie, French Royal 
Commissionner to Canada; Morrell Marston, American Army Officer; and Thomas Forsyth, United States 
agent at Fort Armstrong, trans. and ed. Emma Helen Blair, vol. 1 (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark 
Company, 1912), 96. 
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The alliance between the French and the Great Lakes tribes depended on good 
trade relations and balanced precariously upon a fine line of mutual understanding drawn 
between the two sides.  Anything that upset this balance threatened the alliance.  An 
initial problem in the alliance’s trade system was that the two races had different ideas of 
what commerce was and what place it held in society.  To the American Indians, trade 
was not merely an economic transaction.  It was part of a more complex social 
relationship.  While the French traders were in part controlled by the European market, or 
at least forced to comply with its ups and downs, the majority of the American Indians 
did not believe that the larger economic forces operating across such distance applied to 
them, and therefore did not tolerate market fluctuations as they applied to their goods.  
Therefore, while French traders, if left to themselves, would be out for any profit they 
could obtain, French officials realized that cheating their children would not be good for 
the alliance.  They intervened, when the occasion called for it, making sure the natives 
received acceptable prices for their goods.  At times the Crown acted as a buffer if the 
European market was in a slump.16 
The American Indian trade system did not revolve around profit.  It was not a 
business in the way that Europeans saw it. It was a system of exchange—framed in the 
context of a gift exchange, in fact—in which both parties must be satisfied, their needs 
met.  One did not seek profit, and the European economic concept of supply and demand 
did not apply.  Quite the opposite; the greater the need of the buyer, the greater the 
obligation of the seller to provide him with the goods he needed—thus, rather than 
raising the price, the seller had to either lower it or simply give the goods as a gift, 
expecting that the buyer would make him a gift in return when he was able—thus leaving 
                                               
16 White, 95. 
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the door open for future trade.  Those involved in trade shared with each other; they did 
not truly buy and sell.  It was an exchange of gifts that bound two parties to each other, 
obliging them to each other and ensuring further trade in the future.  Seemingly in 
contradiction to this, exchanges were often intentionally made unevenly.  If one party 
received a better deal than the other, the second party held an obligation to the first in 
future trades—and this ensured that there would, in fact, be an exchange in the future.17 
Once exchanges between two parties had been terminated, the relationship between the 
two parties was also ended—even on such a large scale as the relationship between the 
French and American Indians.18  Thus, French abuse of the trading system brought 
lowered native opinion regarding the French and put strain on the alliance. 
In American Indian society, the importance of gift-giving in maintaining 
relationships stemmed from several factors.  First, the act of exchanging gifts established 
a social connection.  Thus, people who exchanged gifts were no longer strangers (in a 
society where strangers were dangerous), but were bound by mutual obligation and a 
symbolic kinship.19  This opened the door to further social interaction.  Thus, not only 
Onontio but also French traders found themselves obligated to exchange gifts in order to 
maintain a relationship.  
The fur trade established relationships between French and Native Americans, but 
these relationships, based on trade, were susceptible to fluctuations in the market and 
were therefore unstable.  Onontio’s children understood, to a degree, that French 
merchants were individually responsible for their merchandise; however, they expected 
their father to ensure that they received a fair trade (a “bon marché) from their brothers, 
                                               
17 Ibid., 98-99. 
18 Ibid., 107 
19 Ibid., 114. 
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the French traders—that prices remained relatively constant and that the value of their 
furs did not change according to the market.  In the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
however, the French fur market suffered from oversupply, dropping the price of beaver 
pelts.  Natives became discontent when they could not get what they considered a good 
deal, or even the same price as the previous year, for their furs.  As natives became less 
and less confident in Onontio’s position as “father”, the alliance weakened, and the 
natives began to threaten to turn to the English, who offered better deals in trade and 
therefore could make better fathers.20  The instability of the alliance, coupled with a 
disenchanted view of Europeans altogether, made Native American societies more 
receptive to separatist, neo-traditional religious movements like that led by Neolin. 
Despite their disappointment with Onontio, most Canadian tribes did not turn to 
the British until the end of the French and Indian war, as mentioned previously.  When 
the British finally wrested control of Canada from the French in 1760, the role of Native 
Americans changed—the British did not make better fathers; in fact, they did not accept 
the role of father at all.  The British were more concerned with keeping the French from 
regaining control than with keeping Native Americans happy.21  Rather then maintaining 
a father/children relationship, therefore, the British commander, Lord Amherst, viewed 
Native Americans as a conquered people, subjects of the new empire.22  He allowed the 
prices of goods sold to American Indians to rise—unable to maintain low prices after the 
costly Seven Years’ War—whereas the French government had swallowed heavy losses 
                                               
20 Ibid., 116-117. 
21 Francis Parkman, The Oregon Trail, The Conspiracy of Pontiac (New York: The Library of America, 
1853), 475.  
22 White, 256. 
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in attempting to keep them low—Pontiac complained that prices were higher than what 
the British had promised.23   
Pontiac was not the first to attempt action against the British.  In July of 1761, the 
Seneca sent war belts to the Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Huron, Chippewa, and 
Potawatomie.  They hoped to stage synchronized attacks on the British forts at Detroit, 
Pittsburgh, Presqu’Isle, Venango, and Niagara.  The Seneca’s grievances against the 
British stemmed from fear that the British would overrun their territory and from 
Britain’s failure to reward them for their military service in the war against the French.  A 
large part of the problem was a failure to “cover the dead”—deaths in Seneca society 
(along with most northeastern tribes) needed to be paid for, or covered, with gifts or 
slaves.24  Amherst refused to give the Seneca gifts or ammunition, and even went so far 
as to reward his officers with their land.  The Seneca’s attempt at a pan-Indian 
movement, however, ultimately failed, as many tribes—including Pontiac’s Ottawa at 
Detroit—were not yet ready to unite against the British.25  The Seneca would later take 
the initiative to attack British forts in Pennsylvania after Pontiac attacked Fort Detroit. 
Grievances against the British continued to grow as the year wore on, and by 
1762—shortly before Neolin had his first vision—the American Indians near Detroit 
were thoroughly disenchanted with British policy.  Many of the problems with British-
Indian relations were rooted in material issues.  Amherst felt that giving gifts was a form 
of bribery—understandable if taken in a solely European context, but undiplomatic since 
Native American society saw it differently.  When Sir William Johnson sent him a list of 
supplies desired by the American Indians, Amherst replied that once trade was more 
                                               
23 Peckham, 87. 
24 White, 75-76. 
25 Peckham, 74-75. 
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firmly established they would be able to purchase such items for themselves, sparing the 
Crown the expense.  He continued, “Services must be rewarded; it has ever been a maxim 
with me.  But as to purchasing the good behavior either of Indians or any others, [that] is 
what I do not understand.  When men of whatsoever race behave ill, they must be 
punished but not bribed.”26  Thus, what Amherst saw as a business relationship, Native 
Americans saw as an alliance such as they had with the French.  Denied by the men they 
believed should be providing for them, the American Indian communities living in the 
vicinity of the now-British forts found themselves without their customary supplies.  
Faced with a game scarcity, these communities could not sufficiently feed or clothe 
themselves, and many people suffered and died.27  This troubled atmosphere led to the 
appearance of prophets, such as Neolin, who offered solutions. 
It should be noted (so as not to stereotype all British officers as insensitive to 
American Indian culture) that not all of the officers involved agreed with General 
Amherst.  Captain Donald Campbell (the commander of Fort Detroit until 1762, when he 
was replaced by Major Gladwin) wrote to Henry Bouquet, who commanded Fort Pitt, “I 
am certain if the Indians knew General Amherst’s sentiments about keeping them short of 
powder it would be impossible to keep them in temper…I hope the general will change 
his present way of thinking with regard to Indian affairs.  As I am of the opinion if they 
were supplied with ammunition it would prevent their doing mischief.”28  He repeated 
nearly the same sentiment in another letter to Bouquet dated July 3, 1762.  Amherst 
believed limiting the American Indians’ supply of ammunition would be safest from a 
military standpoint; however, as Campbell knew, for these communities, ammunition 
                                               
26 Ibid., 72. 
27 Parkman, 476. 
28 Peckham, 88. 
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supported both their trade and their lives, as hunting with traditional weapons was no 
longer sufficient.  An intelligence agent reported to George Croghan (Britan’s deputy 
Indian agent) in December 1762 that the western tribes believed the British were 
“preparing them for annihilation.”29    Neolin himself reinforced this sentiment; one 
witness (John Heckewelder, who will shortly be discussed in more detail) reported him 
saying: “above all, you must abstain from drinking their deadly beson, which they have 
forced upon us, for the sake of increasing their gains and diminishing our numbers.”30  
Thus, from the perspective of the American Indians, the British were deliberately 
weakening their communities. 
Grievances against the British made many tribes near Detroit inclined to war,  but 
another factor was the introduction of Neolin’s message.  Neolin had his vision in the 
early 1760s, after the French and Indian war was essentially (but not officially) over and 
while General Amherst controlled British policy in Canada.  Reportedly, as he sat by the 
fire worrying about the evils he saw among his people, a messenger came to him and 
instructed him to journey to visit the Master of Life. 31  The most detailed written 
description of his journey comes to us through Pontiac’s 1763 account (which is recorded 
in a journal thought to belong to Robert Navarre, an habitant, or French resident, of Fort 
Detroit).  Thus, according to Pontiac (in turn according to Navarre), on his way to 
heaven, Neolin first encountered “a great fire coming out of the earth.”32  Trying a 
different path, he came across a glass mountain, where the road ended.  Presently he saw 
                                               
29 Ibid., 97. 
30 Rev. John Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations Who Once Inhabited 
Pennsylvania and the Neighbouring States (Philadelphia: 1819; reprint, Philadelphia: Publication Fund of 
the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1876), xxiii. 
31 Cave, “The Delaware Prophet Neolin,” 271. 
32 [Robert Navarre], Journal of Pontiac’s Conspiracy 1763, ed. M. Agnes Burton (Clarence Monroe 
Burton, 1912), in The Siege of Detroit in 1763, ed. Milo Milton Quaife (Chicago: R.R. Donnelley and Sons 
Company, 1958), 11. 
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“a woman of this mountain, of radiant beauty, whose garments dimmed the whiteness of 
the snow.”33  She instructed him to bathe in the river, and then guided him to the top of 
the mountain, which Neolin had to climb with only his left hand and foot.  Finally he 
arrived at a walled village, where “a handsome man, clothed all in white”34 took him to 
the Master of Life.  The Master of Life told Neolin to pass on his message to his people.  
He claimed responsibility for the scarcity of game, as it was his way of punishing the 
evils of his children.  He was especially emphatic about the evil of allowing Europeans 
on the land he had created for Native Americans, and for relying on the foreigners for 
those things that they should rely on him for.  He instructed Neolin,  
Do not drink more than once, or at most twice in a day; have only one wife and do 
not run after the wives of others nor after the girls; do not fight among yourselves; 
do not ‘make medicine,’ but pray, because in ‘making medicine’ one talks with 
the evil spirit; drive off your lands those dogs clothed in red who will do you 
nothing but harm.  And when ye shall have need of anything address yourselves 
to me; and as to your brothers [the Europeans], I shall give to you as to them; do 
not sell to your brothers what I have put on earth for food.  In short, become good 
and ye shall receive your needs.35 
 
Thus, the Master of Life addressed societal evils such as drunkenness and adultery as 
well as political issues such as trade and the invasion of Native American lands by the 
British.  Upon returning from his journey, Neolin relayed the Master of Life’s message to 
his people and promised that if they followed his instructions, they would gain the power 
to drive the invaders from their lands.36 
The concept of such a vision is familiar to traditional Native American culture, 
but much of the imagery betrays the influence of Christianity.  For example, according to 
the trader James Kenney, the creator was seated on “a Glorious Seat…like the King of 
                                               
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 13. 
35 Ibid., 16. 
36 Cave, “The Delaware Prophet Neolin,” 273. 
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the White People.”37  Before the seventeenth century, Native American concepts of the 
creator did not include omnipotence or omnipresence.  Rather, the Creator and the 
Supreme Being were usually two separate entities.  The Supreme Being could pass 
instructions to men, but was generally not approachable.  One did not pray to him, and he 
was not jealous of other powers, as Neolin’s Master of Life seems to be.  Also thanks to 
European contact was the new racial identity—an “us-versus-them” attitude that grouped 
Native Americans in one unified category and Europeans in another.  Religion reinforced 
this belief—according to the 1757 journal of Louis Antoine de Bougainville, a French 
officer at Fort George, “they [the Ottawa] say that the Master of Life who created them 
was brown and beardless, while he who made Frenchmen was white and bearded.”38  
White asserts that this dualism became more widespread as the relationship between 
Britain and the Great Lakes tribes declined.  Both the decline of the alliance and the new 
sense of racial identity contributed to the success of Neolin’s religion.39  This attitude 
also aided the creation of pan-Indian movements such as those spearheaded by Pontiac 
and the Shawnee brothers.40 
Scholars do not agree on the extent to which Neolin blended traditional Native 
American ideas with new Christian ideas.  Most scholars (Charles Hunter and Anthony 
Wallace, for example) interpreting Neolin’s message through a Christian filter, 
                                               
37 Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 101. 
38 Edward P. Hamilton, ed., Adventure in the Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis Antoine de 
Bougainville 1756-1760 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 133. 
39 White, 283-284. 
40 For more information on American Indian belief systems see Richard White; Gregory Evans Dowd, A 
Spirited Resistance: The North American Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1992). 
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emphasize the similarities between Neolin’s vision and Biblical tales.41  More recently, 
historians such as White and Cave, following a new (post-1970s) philosophy that focuses 
on events from a Native American perspective rather than from the perspective of white 
policy, have begun to emphasize the blend of two cultures that Neolin created.42 On one 
hand, European culture influenced his ideas; but on the other, he rejected European 
customs and goods.   
John Heckewelder, a Moravion Missionary, wrote a monograph in 1819 titled 
History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations who Once Inhabited Pennsylvania 
and the Neighbouring States.  He did so, he claimed, “for the information of those who 
are desirous of knowing the true history of those people, who, for centuries, have been in 
full possession of the country we now inhabit.”43  Heckewelder had direct information 
since he lived among several American Indian tribes while pursuing his missionary 
activities.  Having once had the opportunity to hear one of Neolin’s speeches, 
Heckewelder reports him as saying: 
…put off entirely from yourselves the customs which you have adopted since the 
white people came among us; you are to return to that former happy state, in 
which we lived in peace and plenty, before these strangers came to disturb 
us…Then will the great Spirit give success to our arms; then he will give us 
strength to conquer our enemies, to drive them from hence.44   
 
Thus, Neolin asked his followers to cast off European culture, even though his message 
betrayed some Christian influence. 
Charles Hunter found it incongruous, that Neolin should reject a culture that he 
borrowed from.  In his 1971 article “The Delaware Nativist Revival of the Mid-
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Eighteenth Century,” Hunter stated, “by the mid-eighteenth century, the Delawares had 
internalized white culture to the extent that they could no longer distinguish it from their 
own.  The Delaware’s path was irrevocably tied to that of the white man, as was perhaps 
the most aptly demonstrated in the character of his very attempt to separate the paths.”45  
He argued that Neolin employed a so-called Indian Bible, borrowed Christian concepts of 
Heaven and Hell, and “generated an almost Mosaic pattern of ethics.”46   
In his 1970 monograph The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, Anthony F.C. 
Wallace, a psychological anthropologist and historian, also compared Neolin’s vision to 
that of Moses. 47  Certainly the pillars of flame that Neolin encountered, as well as the 
commandment-like orders the Master of Life gave to Neolin, echo Christian mythology.  
Additionally, as previously mentioned, Neolin’s styling of the Creator as a Supreme 
Being, who does not want his children speaking to other spiritual powers and punishes 
them for their wickedness, has more in common with the Christian God than with other 
Native American concepts of either the Creator or the Master of Life.  Wallace also 
called to attention Neolin’s abandonment of certain cultural traditions such as medicine 
songs and polygamy, and their replacement with “quasi-European concepts” such as sin 
and monotheism.  Wallace did not focus solely on the influence European culture had on 
Neolin, but rather argued that Neolin’s movement combined Native and European 
elements.48 
Neolin’s story contains many elements familiar to the religion of Eastern tribes.  
He made a journey to heaven, and returned with new instructions from the Master of 
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Life.  Many men before him had undertaken similar quests, embarking on dangerous 
journeys and bringing back new rituals from places not of this world.49  Thus, the 
mechanism for change was built into Native American tradition—as Dowd (1992) wrote, 
“they experimented with ‘new’ ritual in ‘traditional’ ways.”50  Such journeys required a 
spirit guide.  The man who appeared at Neolin’s fire, the woman at the glass mountain, 
and the man at the entrance to Heaven all fit the mold for such a guide.51  The 
instructions Neolin received could be interpreted not as Mosaic commandments, but 
rather as a bestowal of power.  Power was the ultimate goal of a sky journey—in 
Neolin’s case, the power to expel the Europeans and to create a better way of life for his 
people.52 
As for the Master of Life, Neolin’s account, though similar to Christianity, also 
echoes the beliefs that the Delaware and nearby tribes held before European contact.  
According to Heckewelder, writing in 1819, the Delaware believed in two powerful 
spirits, one good and one evil.  The powerful good spirit does not address earthly matters 
directly; rather, he “must have his attendants to execute his supreme behests”.53  These 
lesser spirits act as go-betweens, keeping the Great Spirit informed of the state of affairs 
on earth and, should the need arise, taking action on his behalf.  These are the spirits to 
whom most Delaware addressed themselves in supplication.54  Contrary to this, George 
Loskiel, a Moravian missionary, claimed that the Delaware had no concept of the 
Devil—the evil spirit—before the arrival of Europeans.55  It is possible, that both men 
                                               
49 Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 3. 
50 Ibid., 2. 
51 Cave, The Delaware Prophet Neolin, 274. 
52 Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 3. 
53 Heckewelder, 212. 
54 Cave, The Delaware Prophet Neolin, 276. 
55 Ibid., 279. 
 20 
were right in a way.  Louis Antoine de Bougainville wrote in 1757 that “the belief in two 
spirits, one good, the other bad, then one inhabiting the heavens, the other the bowels of 
the earth, now established among them [the Ottawa], goes back only to the time they 
commenced trade with Europeans.”56  It would seem, therefore, that the evil spirit that 
Neolin referred to was the product of the influence of Christianity, and that Heckewelder 
collected his information after the Christian idea had already taken root. 
Although Neolin’s message was certainly influenced by Christianity—at least in 
part—Native American society had also been influenced by Christianity.  Thus, Neolin’s 
message ultimately met his society’s need for a religion that would address current social, 
economic, and political problems.  This is why it was so influential.  American Indians 
knew what was wrong with their world—misfortune brought upon them by the anger of 
Master of Life proved that something was wrong—and Neolin told them what they 
needed to do to remedy these wrongs.  As Richard White suggests, “Neolin might 
denounce white practices, but what he really preached was Indian guilt.”57  This guilt 
stemmed from incorporating white culture into their own—something that, according to 
Neolin, was not appropriate to their way of life.  By accepting their guilt, White argues, 
American Indians  took control of their lives—thus, Neolin promised power to those who 
reformed their “sinful” ways.58 
Thus, Neolin’s message eventually reached Pontiac, who accepted it and made it 
the ideology behind his movement.  Neolin’s message provided a religious reason to 
attack the British, but it also addressed the political and economic issues (game scarcity, 
the fur trade, and invasion of American Indian land) that were already inclining many 
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tribes toward war.  Additionally, the rumor of the pending return of the French to power 
gave hope that the movement could be successful.  Documentation of this rumor 
originates primarily from British officers, who were eager to blame their old enemies for 
instigating the Indian uprising.59  Whether the French spread the rumor in hopes of 
stirring up trouble for the British or whether the rumor was merely wishful thinking, 
Pontiac hoped—or at least assured his warriors—that once the British were weakened 
their French “father” would return.  Navarre reported Pontiac as saying to his gathered 
Ottawas and Hurons in his war council of May 5, 1763, “Have I not shown you the 
wampum belts which I received from our Great Father, the Frenchman?  He tells us to 
strike them.”60  Thus, bolstered by political, moral, and social righteousness, Pontiac 
instigated an attack on the British. 
In his account of Neolin’s vision to his gathered warriors, Pontiac referred to 
“those dogs clothed in red” (the British) as the ones who must be driven out of America.  
Scholars disagree on whether this distinction between the British and the French was 
Pontiac’s amendment or Neolin’s true intent—an important distinction in the debate over 
whether or not Pontiac truly embraced Neolin’s ideas.  Those inclined to believe that the 
intelligent, rational military commander simply used Neolin’s religion as impetus for his 
own purposes argue that he changed the message (which, they claim, originally spoke 
against all Europeans) so that he could continue to rely on French support against the 
British.  This mindset can be found mainly among historians from the nineteenth century 
to the mid-1970s—that is, those writing in a time when American Indian society, and 
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especially religion, did not command much respect, either in the scholarly community or 
in white society in general.   
Howard Peckham, for example, argued that Pontiac used Neolin’s message to 
further his own ends.  He introduced Neolin as “a psychopathic Delaware,”61 and later 
stated, “It should be noted that the Delaware Prophet was not a war chief who desired to 
lead a military expedition to drive out the English and restore French domination.”62  
Thus, he de-emphasized Neolin’s role, focusing almost exclusively on the military aspect 
of the movement.  Of Pontiac, he wrote, “Whether or not he followed the interpretation to 
the conclusion of simple, resourceful living, he shrewdly recognized the power of the 
Prophet’s argument.  Here was an appeal that could unite the Indians in a common war 
effort!”63   
Charles Hunter, analyzing the Pontiac’s account of Neolin’s vision, argued that 
“The phrase, ‘dogs clothed in red,’ would seem to be of Pontiac’s invention, in order to 
restrict his indictment to the English, and demonstrates a reinterpretation of the nativist 
movement to suit more political needs.”64  Though it is true that Pontiac solicited the aid 
of the French against the British, more recent scholars offer differing opinions on 
Pontiac’s adherence to Neolin’s beliefs.   
Richard White’s 1991 monograph The Middle Ground marks a turning point in 
scholarship because his approach to the conflict between Native American (specifically 
the Great Lakes area) and European culture was to examine it as a blend of two societies, 
both of which experienced change thanks to the other.  Unlike Hunter, he pointed out 
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that, due to the difficulty involved in translating the word “white”, this interpretation of 
the British as the enemy, rather than the French, may have been Neolin’s intention all 
along.65  Thus, it is possible that Pontiac did not twist Neolin’s message to serve his own 
purposes; rather, specifically targeting the British as the enemy was Neolin’s intent all 
along.  
Gregory E. Dowd argued that Pontiac did not simply use Neolin’s message to 
gather followers, but truly ascribed to it.  He published an article in 1992 called 
“Thinking and Believing: Nativism and Unity in the Ages of Pontiac and Tecumseh”.  
His primary argument was that Pontiac and Tecumseh, two military leaders who were 
backed by (or who backed up) religious leaders, could both think and believe.  That is to 
say, they were rational men with political aims who nevertheless wholly subscribed to the 
religious teachings of Neolin and Tenskwatawa, respectively.  This challenged the 
thinking of most early historians, who separated the military and religious aspects of the 
movement, as if they were two things that could not coexist.  He speculated on the 
distinction historians made between the sacred and the secular: “Perhaps this distinction 
results from the paradoxical product of Christian hostility toward native belief and of 
secular hostility toward belief in general.”66  Thus, as society became more accepting of 
Native American religion, scholars gave more credibility to prophets such as Neolin and 
Tenskwatawa, and became more accepting of the fact that “rational” men such as Pontiac 
and Tecumseh could truly adhere to the religions presented by the prophets.  In reference 
to Pontiac’s distinction between British and French, Dowd argued that Neolin himself 
drew the distinction.  As evidence, he refers to Navarre’s journal, which reports that a 
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group of Chippewas, Delawares, and Shawnees who, during Pontiac’s siege of Detroit, 
reminded Pontiac, “the Master of Life by one of our brother Delawares…forbade us to 
attack our brothers the French.”67  This, then, is another source that reports Neolin’s 
message as favorable to the French. 
Thus, Pontiac, embracing Neolin’s message, finally solidified a plan to carry out 
one of the Master of Life’s injunctions:  to make war upon the British.  At his war council 
of May 5, 1763, after reminding his gathered Ottawa and Huron warriors (his immediate 
neighbors) of British abuses and assuring them of aid from the French and from other 
tribes, Pontiac gave his account of Neolin’s journey, using the commands of the Master 
of Life to unite all the members of the tribes at the council.68  He planned to begin his 
assault on Fort Detroit on May 7.  Thanks to an unknown informant, however, Major 
Gladwin—the officer in charge of the fort—learned of the plan the night before it was to 
be carried out.  Pontiac had counted on having all 300 of his warriors armed with 
concealed weapons within the fort before beginning the assault, but suddenly faced with 
Detroit’s increased defenses and only allowed to bring his 10 chiefs inside, Pontiac did 
not give the signal to attack.69  Bereft of the advantage of surprise and unable to carry out 
his original plan to attack the fort from the inside, on May 9 Pontiac and his warriors laid 
siege to Detroit.70 
Francis Parkman’s flair for the dramatic and his desire for a hero to fill his readers 
with excitement and sympathy made him believe that Pontiac planned the subsequent 
attacks on other British forts.  He wrote, “The peril of the times was unfolded in its full 
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extent before him [Pontiac], and he resolved to unite the tribes in one grand effort to avert 
it.”71  The evidence, however, does not support this; while he did invite other tribes—the 
Chippewas and the Ottawas of the Michilimackinac and the Thames River—to join his 
assault, Pontiac did not plan the sweeping movement that would overthrow nearly all the 
British forts in the Great Lakes region.  He did, however, make the first move—an 
example, as it was, for others to follow—and became popularly known as the de facto 
leader of the movement.  He also sent some of his warriors to Fort Sandusky and Fort St. 
Joseph.72  Fort Sandusky fell on May 16 to a surprise attack by Detroit Ottawas and 
Hurons joined by local Hurons.  The warriors suffered no casualties, and news of their 
success strengthened “Pontiac’s war”.73  Fort St. Joseph (located in Niles, Michigan) fell 
on May 25—the warriors used the same attack plan as the one used at Sandusky, the one 
Pontiac had hoped to use at Detroit.  Additionally, on May 27 Fort Wayne, Indiana fell to 
a group of warriors who Pontiac had sent to seek aid from the French.74  They were 
subsequently joined by Weas, Kickapoos, Mascoutens and conquered Fort Ouiatenon—
the southwestern limit of Britain’s authority—without bloodshed on June 1.75 
After receiving news of Pontiac’s siege, other nations soon began to take the 
initiative to capture British forts, planning attacks independently.  The Delaware and 
Mingo besieged Fort Pitt on May 29.  An unknown group of American Indians fired upon 
Fort Ligonier, in Pennsylvania, on June 2.  After being chased off, they move further east 
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to attack Fort Bedford.76  A group of Chippewas and Sauks, later joined by northern 
Ottawas, took Fort Michilimackinac by surprise on June 2.77  At about this time, the 
Shawnee and Seneca joined the Delaware at Fort Pitt.  Some Senecas moved to attack 
Fort Venango, in Franklin, Pennsylvania.  They took the fort on June 16, killing all 
within.78  The same group took Fort Le Boeuf, in Waterford, Pennsylvania, on June 18.  
They then moved to Fort Presqu’Isle, in Erie, Pennslyvania, which, with the help of the 
200 Hurons, Ottawas, and Chippewas who had been sent from Detroit, they conquered on 
June 19.79 
Back in the west, the British officers at Fort Edward Augustus, hearing of the fall 
of Fort Michilimackinac and having no hope of holding out against the attack they knew 
would come, abandoned their posts on June 21.  They left the fort in the hands of local 
Sauks, Foxes, Menominees, and Winnebagoes, who had not committed themselves to 
Pontiac’s war but rather chose to maintain their neutrality.  Thus, by July of 1763, of the 
British forts in the Western Great Lakes area, only Fort Detroit remained in British 
hands.80  Fort Pitt, however, remained locked in stalemate, and Pontiac saw no progress 
at Detroit.  The hoped-for French aid never came, and the siege at Detroit ended 
ambiguously in early fall.  Pontiac and the other chiefs negotiated for peace.81 
“Pontiac’s war,” so named because he made the first move and not because he 
orchestrated it in its entirety, caused King George III to issue the Proclamation of 1763 
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on October 7, which set the crest of the Appalachians as the boundary of Western 
settlement.  News of this never reached Pontiac; additionally, settlers did not observe the 
proclamation and the British army was not able to effectively enforce it.82 
Thus, Pontiac’s war came to an inconclusive end.  British armies invaded Ohio in 
1764, attempting to bring all the rebellious tribes to heel—with little success. Thomas 
Gage, the commander in chief of British forces in North America, wrote of the 1764 
campaign to Campbell on June 5, 1765: “We neither attacked them, or made Peace with 
them.  Pondiac [sic] was thought to have lost His influence,…And when it was found that 
he was still powerful, No means were taken to make Friends with Him.”83  According to 
an unknown French source, Pontiac, after being told of France’s surrender to Britain four 
years earlier in 1760, replied, 
Tell your general [Amherst] to withdraw all of his peole promptly from our lands.  
We do not intend to allow any of them to set foot there.  The cession by Onontio 
of which you haughtily speak to us arouses two very different responses in our 
hearts: laughter at the mad pretension of your master, and tears at the misfortunes 
of our father.84 
 
Pontiac, in addition to other Great Lakes chiefs, refused to believe that Onontio was 
completely defeated, and treated news of his surrender with contempt. 
Thus, Amherst did not see a decisive victory; nor did the Native Americans.  The 
British were not driven out of Canada, and the French would not return to power; 
however, as Richard White argues, the war was not a complete failure for Pontiac, 
Neolin, and those who joined their cause.  The American Indians did not become 
conquered subjects—although they were ready for peace, they were still quite capable of 
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war, while the British waged war only to the detriment of settlement, the fur trade, and 
the royal treasury.  Rather than one side conquering the other, then, the two powers 
worked for accommodation, which was several years in coming.85  Each tribe made a 
treaty or conducted a peace ceremony with the British individually between 1764 and 
1766.  Pontiac formally ended his war with the British in July 1766.  Historian Colin 
Calloway (2003) describes the ceremony: Pontiac took Sir William [William Johnson, 
British Indian agent] by the hand, [and] the western delegates and the Six Nations 
exchanged war belts.”86  With the conclusion of the war, the Great Lakes tribes finally 
acknowledged the British as their fathers. 
Thus Pontiac, rather than destroying British power, forced them to become more 
like the “fathers” that the French had been, willing to adapt their policies to more closely 
fit to Native American standards.87  Pontiac remained a key figure; although he was not, 
in reality, the leader of the “conspiracy,” he was later identified as the leader of the 
movement by the British, the French habitants, and by many American Indians.  He led, 
not a tribe, or a group of tribes, but rather a group of American Indians with a common 
cause—he had transcended tribal boundaries.88 
In the end, the peace treaty agreed upon in 1765 brought about a return of the 
former status quo.89  Pontiac and Neolin, therefore, failed in their attempt to overthrow 
the British, but succeeded in joining together a group of tribes in a common cause and in 
establishing a new sense of racial identity and unity.  Once accomplished, other 
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movements—including that of Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh—could more readily do the 
same. 
Fighting resumed only ten years later, in 1775, with the beginning of the 
American Revolution.  The Revolution affected numerous tribes, not only because it 
established a new power in North America, but also because the war itself affected an 
entire generation of people—disputes over Native American land continued well after the 
Revolution ended, until the Treaty of Greenville in 1795 (which was itself only a 
temporary solution, as will be discussed later).  Thus, for twenty years, Native Americans 
living in what would become America experienced nothing but war.  American Indians, 
many confused as to which side they should join and many wishing to stay out of British 
affairs, found it difficult to maintain neutrality during the American Revolution.  The 
British, the Americans, and even the Spanish pressed tribes to join their side.  The 
Shawnee tried to remain neutral, but their placement in Ohio country, on the American 
frontier, made this impossible.  American settlers pushed westward, compelling the 
Shawnee to join the British.  They raided American settlements, and the American army 
burned Shawnee villages and fields.90 
The end of the Revolution in 1783 did not mean the end of violence between the 
Shawnee and Americans.  Like many American Indian tribes, the American Revolution 
forced the Shawnee out of their villages.  Communities broke apart and reassembled in 
the far northwest corner of their territory, often incorporating members of other 
communities or even other tribes into their social structure.91  This dislocation, similar to 
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that experienced by the Delaware in Neolin’s time, created the atmosphere of deprivation 
that lent itself to the rise of prophets and laid the ground for future intertribal unity. 
American invasion of Shawnee lands continued.  Former revolutionaries, having 
seen the plentiful fields of the Shawnee, became settlers eager to gain the fertile land of 
the Ohio Valley.  The United States government, under the Confederation, claimed all 
land to the Mississippi by right of conquest, thus, as the British had in Neolin’s time, 
treating American Indians as subjects.92  Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh grew up, therefore, 
in an atmosphere of demoralization and violence. 
As shown in the case of Pontiac and Neolin, a military leader—whether white or 
Indian—is often associated with a particular religious leader.  Less frequently, however, 
are secular and ecclesiastical leaders personally connected.  Whereas Pontiac and Neolin 
had no relationship prior to Neolin’s ascension to the role of prophet—and afterward had 
an informal relationship at best—Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh were brothers.  In fact, 
they belonged to a set of triplets.  They were, therefore, intimately connected.  This 
meant that sacred and mundane aspects of their movement were more closely linked than 
in Pontiac’s conspiracy.  Furthermore, whereas Neolin did not take a military role in 
Pontiac’s war, Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh jointly led their people.  Pontiac spoke for 
Neolin to his warriors, but Tenskwatawa could speak for himself.  In the case of the 
Shawnee brothers, it is difficult to ascertain whether one man was exploiting the other 
and, if so, who was controlling whom.  Some historians maintain that Tecumseh used 
Tenskwatawa’s religion to further his own aims, but it is likely that the two worked 
together towards a common cause, the pan-Indian movement that aspired to keep the 
United States of America from spreading further westward. 
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Tecumseh, born in territory that is now Ohio sometime between 1768 and 1771, 
rose to prominence among the Shawnee as a great warrior.93   The Shawnee were divided 
into families, each led by a chief.  Benjamin Drake, one of Tecumseh’s earliest and most 
prominent biographers (writing in 1841), describes this organization:  
Of these twelve [original families], the names of but four tribes are preserved, the 
rest having become extinct, or incorporated with them.  They are, 1st. the 
Mequachake,—2d. The Chillicothe,—3d. the Kiskapocoke,—4th. The Piqua….In 
each of the four tribes, except the Mequachake, the chiefs owe their authority to 
merit, but in the last named, the office is hereditary….Mequachake, signifies a 
perfect man.  To this tribe the priesthood is confided.94 
 
Tecumseh and his siblings belonged to what modern historians name the Kispoko tribe 
(Kiskapocoke in the quotation from Drake).95  Based on his merit, therefore, Tecumseh 
became a chief beginning in 1795.96  
Early historians initially stereotyped Tecumseh as the epitome of the “noble 
savage” because of his diplomacy and compassion.  Romantic historians in the nineteenth 
century, such as Benjamin Drake and Reed Beard, idealized him for this, especially in 
comparison to Tenskwatawa, who received much criticism because of his religious 
fervor.  Additionally, the Shawnee Prophet was born slightly twisted, making him much 
less handsome and athletic than Tecumseh.  To add to this, he lost his right eye in a 
hunting accident early in life, adding to his physical deformity and giving romantics the 
opportunity to speculate that his outer appearance was a sign of his troubled mind and 
spirit.  This simply demonstrates the willingness of white society at the time to laud those 
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who showed signs of conforming to white standards, while denouncing those who were 
openly different. 
Tecumseh’s conflict with the United States centered on the Greenville Treaty, 
signed in 1795.  A description of the Greenville Treaty, however, begs an explanation of 
the conflict that it resolved.  Throughout the 1780s and 1790s, large number of American 
pioneers advanced into the Ohio country—20,000 between 1785 and 1790.  Either in 
response to a perceived threat, or as a natural result of the increased population density of 
the area, the native inhabitants killed large numbers of these settlers—between 1,500 and 
2,000 in the 1780s.  The settlers pressed the United States government to retaliate.  
Nevertheless, the government withheld military assistance until 1790, when federal 
interests required an army.  In 1787, Congress had passed the Northwest Ordinance, 
which claimed federal ownership of a vast amount of territory between the Great Lakes 
and the Ohio River, up to the Mississippi.  Such a claim required the presence of U.S. 
troops to back it up.97  Thus, the United States sent troops as much to protect its land 
from settlers as to protect settlers from Native Americans. 
Unfortunately, poor diplomacy by the army commanders aggravated local 
Indians.98  The situation reached its breaking point when Henry Knox, the Secretary of 
War, informed the British of the American army’s plan to raise a militia and attack the 
Miami and the Shawnee (in order to allay possible British concerns about the amassing 
force).  British officer Maj. Patrick Murray, the recipient of this message, informed the 
Miami and Shawnee.  Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, the Miami and Shawnee war chiefs, 
then gathered their tribes and allies (including warriors from the Ottowa, the Fox, and the 
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Sauk) and ambushed the American force in the autumn of 1790. 99  For five years the 
Indian alliance and the United States engaged in a series of raids and skirmishes.  For the 
most part, the alliance held the upper hand, until a pivotal battle in 1794, the Battle of 
Fallen Timbers.  The previous year, in the winter of 1793, Lord Dorchester, the governor 
of Canada, gave a speech to a gathering of Iroquois and other Native Americans from the 
St. Lawrence area.  He reminded them of grievances against the United States, and hinted 
that Britain might be favorable to going to war with the Americans: “I shall not be 
surprized [sic] if we are at war with them in the course of the present year.”100  He spoke 
out of anger and did not represent British policy; nevertheless, the Indians believed that 
Britain would support their effort (the British Indian agents had already been supplying 
the alliance with goods).   
Benjamin Drake said of the battle in 1794, “this memorable action … gave 
victory to the American army, and humbled the north-western Indians”.101  Indeed, the 
American army decisively held the upper hand for the first time.  Historian Robert 
McAfee (1816) described the result of the battle as “a complete discomfiture of the 
Indians”.102  Although their descriptions of the battle are technically accurate, it must be 
noted that these two early-19th century American historians felt a definite “us-versus-
them” attitude regarding the events they wrote about.  Thus, their exuberant descriptions 
of the American victory were likely slightly exaggerated for both dramatic effect and 
national pride.   
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The coup de grace for the native alliance, however, came not from the American 
troops but from the British.  When Blue Jacket’s warriors retreated from the battle, they 
arrived at the nearby British Fort Miamis expecting shelter—the fort had provided them 
with provisions right up until the battle began—and found, instead, a barred gate guarded 
by armed men under instructions not to let them in.103 The British refused them shelter, 
not wanting to start a battle with the pursuing Americans.  Their fears were justified; 
when the American army arrived, Captain William Campbell, the commandant, sent a 
message to Anthony Wayne, who commanded the Americans, asking why the army was 
camped outside the gates of Fort Miamis.  Wayne replied that they were searching the 
area for Native Americans.  He added ominously that, had he found any, Campbell’s post 
and guns “would not have much impeded the progress of the Victorious Army under my 
command.”104  Blue Jacket and his warriors eventually reached the Lake Erie. There, 
British Indian agents Alexander McKee and Matthew Elliott cared for the tattered army, 
supplying food and clothing.  Devoid of the desire to continue fighting under the 
circumstances, representatives of the Indian nations traveled to Greenville in January 
1795, to discuss peace.105 
The Americans hoped, through the Treaty of Greenville, to obtain as much of the 
Ohio valley area as possible without unduly aggravating the native inhabitants by taking 
too much.  The treaty established a boundary between territory belonging to the white 
Americans and the natives, although the United States reserved the right to establish and 
maintain military bases within the native territory.  The treaty essentially declared that, 
aside from some particular tracts of land, the United States owned the country up to the 
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Ohio River, but not beyond: “The United States relinquish their claims to all other Indian 
lands northward of the river Ohio, eastward of the Mississippi, and westward and 
southward of the Great Lakes and the waters uniting them.”106  The Americans also 
promised the Indians a yearly stipend of goods worth $9,500. Blue Jacket, who received 
$300 per year through a private arrangement, agreed to the terms of the treaty.  Little 
Turtle argued that the Americans claimed important hunting grounds and travel routes, 
but the other chiefs saw no problem—in August of 1795 the representatives of twelve 
Indian nations—the Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnees, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, 
Miami, Eel-river, Weas, Kispoko, Piankashaw, and Kaskaskia signed the treaty with the 
United States. 107 
Tecumseh, who had participated in the raids and skirmishes of the war as a 
commander but not a tactician, opted to not attend the conference at Greenville.108  His 
motives for doing so are not known, but one might suppose that he did so as a form of 
protest—the Greenville conference was, essentially, a setting for American Indians to 
formally surrender to the Americans.  Not doing so, therefore, raised Tecumseh’s status 
in the opinions of other Native American chiefs.109 
In the years following the treaty, Tecumseh and his people stayed more or less on 
the move, forced to do so by a game scarcity largely caused by increasing American 
settlement, the fur trade, and war.  They stayed for most of 1795 at Deer Creek, migrated 
to the upper Miami Valley in 1796, and in 1797 moved on to the White Water River in 
                                               
106 “A Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Tribes of Indians, called the 
Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoes, Ottawas, Chipewas, Putawatimes, Miamis, Eel-river, Weea’s, 
Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and Kaskaskias,” 3 August 1795, in Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, ed. 
Charles J. Kappler, LL. M., vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904; reprint, New York: 
Ams Press, 1971, 39. 
107 Gilbert, 188-189. 
108 Drake, 83. 
109 Gilbert, 191. 
 36 
eastern Indiana, where they stayed until 1800.  At this time they joined a group of 
Delaware on the White River, where they lived for five years.110 
Thomas Jefferson was president at this time (1801-1809).  In his own words, he 
wanted the United States to co-exist peacefully with American Indians.  In a confidential 
letter (1803) to William H. Harrison Governor of the Indiana Territory, he wrote: “Our 
system is to live in perpetual peace with the Indians, to cultivate an affectionate 
attachment from them…by giving them effectual protection against wrongs from our own 
people.”111  He wrote of encouraging American Indians to rely on agriculture for 
sustenance because of the game scarcity—and how this would encourage them to 
relinquish the vast tracts of land they used to hunt in exchange for small plots. He also 
declared that he intended “at our trading houses to sell so low as merely to repay us cost 
and charges.”112  This, he said, would discourage private traders, “and we shall thus get 
clear of this pest.”113  Thus, in a way, Jefferson intended to be “father” to Native 
Americans living in the United States; on the other hand, he expected more out of the 
relationship than Onontio had.  He wanted American Indians to either assimilate or 
“remove beyond the Mississippi.”114 
In 1805 Tenskwatawa, who was at that time a drunkard and a shaman of little 
repute named Laulewasikaw, passed out at his campfire and, when he awoke, claimed to 
have visited the Great Spirit, from whom he received instructions to pass on to his 
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people.115  Upon his return he took the name Tenskwatawa, which means “The Open 
Door.”116  From his new position of spiritual power, the Prophet preached against societal 
evils such as drunkenness, witchcraft, and spousal abuse.  The story of his journey 
changed slightly with each retelling, although this could be attributed to the fact that a 
different witness recorded his story each time.  For the most part, accounts of his vision 
come to us through historians writing well after the fact. 
According to Drake (1841), when Tenskwatawa first spoke to an assemblage of 
various tribes, “He told them that since he had become a prophet, he went up into the 
clouds; that the first place he came to was the dwelling of the Devil, and that all who had 
died drunkards were there, with flames issuing out of their mouths”.117  The instructions 
Tenskwatawa received from the Great Spirit centered on separation from the influence of 
white men.  Reed Beard, a historian writing in 1889, described Tenskwatawa’s call for 
social reform:  
In the religion taught by The Prophet were found many virtues, gained for the 
most part by contact with white travelers, and adulterated with Indian superstition.  
He insisted upon temperance, preaching total abstinence from intoxicants.  He 
taught reverence for old age and sympathy for the weak and infirm.  He 
condemned the intermarriage of different races and believed that the Indians 
should adhere to their own customs of living, especially in dress.118 
 
Beard, of course, saw virtues in the similarities between Tenskwatawa’s message and his 
own Christian beliefs.  His bias as a white American living in the 19th century—a 
religiously charged period—inclined him toward approval of values that reflected 
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Christian beliefs.  He also approved of a separation of the races, which is why he includes 
condemnation of intermarriage in his list of virtues.     
Tenskwatawa’s own words come to us through a speech he made in 1808 to 
Major-General William H. Harrison.  Harrison had been afraid that Tenskwatawa was a 
tool of the British, but the prophet assured him: “I had no other intention but to introduce 
among the Indians those good principles of religion which the white people profess.”119  
He went on to report the essential part of his vision: “The Great Spirit told me to tell the 
Indians, that he had made them and made the world—that he had placed them on it to do 
good, and not evil…That we ought to consider ourselves as one man…that they should 
not drink whiskey…and that they must always follow the directions of the Great 
Spirit.”120  He spoke of his accomplishments at that time: “The religion which I have 
established for the last three years, has been attended to by the different tribes of Indians 
in this part of the world.  Those Indians were once different people; they are now but one; 
they are all determined to practise [sic] what I have communicated to them.”121  Thus, 
three years after his vision, Tenskwatawa had gathered members of various tribes and 
forged them into a homogenous group, convincing them to abandon whiskey and to rely 
more on agriculture than on hunting, reducing the effects of the game scarcity.   
In his speech to Harrison, Tenskwatawa also professed good intentions toward the 
United States.  He claimed that he forbid his followers from taking up the tomahawk, and 
according to Moses Dawson, a historian writing in 1824, “He frequently, in presence of 
the Governor, harangued his followers, and his constant theme was the evils arising from 
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war, and from the immoderate use of ardent spirits”.122  He said to Harrison: “I now 
inform you that it is our intention to live in peace with our father [Thomas Jefferson] and 
his people for ever.”123  As this turned out not to be true, a number of possible 
explanations present themselves.  First, it is possible that he did intend to live in peace 
with the Americans but eventually accepted the inevitability of war.  Second, he who 
translated or transcribed the speech may have made an error.  It would seem that he made 
other errors—the title of the speech refers to Tenskwatawa as “Lolawawchicka, or The 
Loud Voice.”  The prophet, however, used the name Tenskwatawa by this time; 
furthermore, most other translations of “Lauliwasika” give the name the meaning “the 
rattle.”124  Another possibility is that Tenskwatawa went to Harrison with the intention of 
calming his fears, essentially saying what needed to be said in order to placate him, as the 
Shawnee brothers were not yet ready for war.  According to Dawson, Tenskwatawa 
announced his intention to visit Harrison by sending a messenger who gave “a very 
pacific and conciliatory speech.  The bearer of the message complained bitterly of the 
misrepresentation which had been circulated relative to the prophet’s views and 
dispositions towards the citizens of the United States.”125  Thus, Tenskwatawa’s speech, 
though in his own words (or as close as we can get through the filter of translation and 
transcription), is partially suspect because it was designed to persuade the governor not to 
go to war against his people.  Like Neolin, Tenskwatawa’s message reflected the blend of 
white culture with tradition that characterized Native American society at the time.  His 
vision of drunkards burning in the afterlife, for example, reflects the Christian idea of 
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hell.  Richard White attests that Tenskwatawa was influenced by other prophets as well 
as by American religious upheavals.  He cites the appearance of Shakers in 1802—
Americans who fell over as though dead, then upon regaining consciousness, repented of 
their sins and started new lives of goodness.  It is possible that this influenced 
Tenskwatawa; however, there is no evidence of his contact with Shakers until after he 
settled at Greenville.126   
Another interesting correlation between this revised American Indian religion and 
Christianity is the concurrence of Neolin and Tecumseh’s movements with the First and 
Second Great Awakenings—a series of Christian religious movements.  The First Great 
Awakening, roughly occurring in the 1730s and 1740s, preceded Neolin’s movement, 
while the Second Great Awakening, occurring approximately in the 1820s and 1830s, 
followed Tenskwatawa’s movement.  The Great Awakenings affected not only whites but 
slaves and Native Americans as well—American Indian participation in Christian 
meetings increased dramatically.127  It is possible, therefore, that the Christian 
movements influenced, and later were influenced by, the movements of Native American 
prophets.  It is also possible that they occurred in such similar time frames because both 
cultures experienced similar societal environments—environments that created an 
atmosphere ideal for religious revival.  For example, Anthony Wallace wrote of the early 
eighteenth century,  
the difficulties of the early settlers in the Seneca country were not merely the first-
year sufferings of pioneers in a new land.  To the inevitable hardships and 
disappointments of frontier life had been added the misery of irredeemable 
poverty.  It is not surprising, therefore, that across this dark and barren country a 
wave a religious enthusiasm began to swell.128 
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Thus, both white settlers and American Indians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
lived in a time of depravation, which led to religious revivals. 
Despite some influence by white culture, Tenskwatawa, like Neolin, rejected it.  
Aside from desiring a separation from American influence, he also gave Americans a 
new identity.  He associated them with the sea and therefore the Great Serpent, who 
represented evil powers.  The Americans’ connections with the Great Serpent essentially 
made them devils.  White wrote, “Just as Indian haters envisioned Algonquians [Great 
Lakes tribes] as devil worshippers and ‘red devils,’ so Americans had become children of 
the Great Serpent.”129  Thus, the new racial identity that began in Neolin’s time had fully 
become reciprocal Indian hating by Tenskwatawa’s time. 
Tenskwatawa also instigated a campaign against witchcraft.  Traditionally, 
historians credited this campaign with a rapidly formed, enthusiastic following.  John 
Heckewelder, the Moravian missionary, wrote in 1876 that the Shawnee prophet’s “bold 
assertions met with implicit belief, and he obtained by that means such an unlimited 
command over a credulous multitude, that at last, he had only to speak the word, or even 
to nod, and the pile was quickly prepared by willing executioners.”130  Although 
Heckewelder witnessed some prophets in person, he did not seem to be well acquainted 
with Tenskwatawa—in fact, he mistakenly believed that Tecumseh and the Shawnee 
Prophet were the same person.  His information, therefore, must have been secondhand at 
best.  Additionally, according to Drake, Tenskwatawa singled out individuals, especially 
chiefs, who were hostile to him or to his design (at times, traditional-minded chiefs 
resisted unity, and acculturated individuals favored accommodation with the United 
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States.  The subsequent loss of reputation, if not life, discredited the individuals and made 
their negative opinions regarding the Prophet much less valid.131  According to Alfred A. 
Cave, however, recent historians have questioned the supposed enthusiasm for the witch-
hunt, due to a lack of solid evidence concerning how many people the Prophet and his 
followers actually executed as witches.132 
The concept of what is called witchcraft is different in Native American society 
than in European society.  Witches were malicious people who abused power that could 
be used benevolently.  This power was usually associated with a talisman, the medicine 
bag or bundle.  Thus, having supernatural powers was not evil; only malevolent use of 
this power to cause misfortune made an individual a witch.  The fear of witchcraft was 
common in Native American culture before the appearance of Europeans.  Whether or 
not witches were commonly executed is a questionable matter.   
The climate of deprivation and demoralization that led to the profusion of 
prophets in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries also led to a heightened fear of 
witchcraft.  After Europeans arrived in North America, bringing with them new diseases 
and war, Native American societies blamed these calamities on witchcraft used against 
them by the Europeans.  This reflects the tendency to blame witchcraft on outsiders—
societies commonly held that witches used their power on other tribes, not against their 
own clan.133 
Tenskwatawa did not strictly conform to the traditional definition of witchcraft.  
Traditionally, spiritual power could be used for either good or evil, but the Prophet 
wanted to destroy all medicine bundles, claiming that they held pieces of the Great 
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Serpent, an evil being, and blamed them for causing social strife, disorder, and sickness.  
Additionally, he did not adhere to the practice of accusing only outsiders—he accused 
members, and even chiefs, of the villages he visited.134 
Tenskwatawa’s witch-hunt seems to have had a mixed reception.  He did not 
force his hunt on terrified and unwilling communities; in fact, at times he visited 
communities that had already resolved to purge themselves of witches but needed 
Tenskwatawa’s aid to point out the guilty parties.135  The Delaware and Wyandot villages 
in which he picked out victims to burn had asked the Prophet to come to them and 
identify the witches amongst them.136  Interestingly, many of those accused turned out to 
be people with connections to white culture—Christians, for example, or chiefs who had 
ceded land to the United States.137  At Woapikamunk, the village the Delaware invited 
him to in 1806,138 Tenskwatawa singled out five people (from a group of suspects chosen 
by the Delaware) as witches.  The first was woman raised by Moravian missionaries, the 
second a chief who avocated accommodation with the United States, the third a Mahican 
interpreter for the Moravians, the fourth a Christian convert, nephew of the accused chief, 
and the fifth, who was not executed, the widow of the accused chief.139 
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Despite this support, the witch-hunt faced strong opponents.  According to 
Anthony Shane, a young man among the Delaware—the brother of the last woman 
accused of witchcraft—put a halt to the executions in his village with a few words of 
reason: “The devil has come among us, and we are killing each other".140  The Moravian 
missionaries, probably a less romantic and more reliable source, wrote in their diary for 
April 9-10 1806: “We heard that the savages were about to put to death their last 
surviving chief…the friends of the chief…threatened to kill anyone who should take part 
in the murder.  This put a check on further slaughter.”141 The chief of the Wyandot 
stopped Tenskwatawa from executing any of the Wyandot witches he identified.  By 
1806, the Delaware and Shawnee tribes were divided amongst themselves in support of 
or opposition to Tenskwatawa’s witch-hunt.142 
Tecumseh’s position on his brother’s actions remains a matter of debate.  Bil 
Gilbert (1989) contended that Tecumseh could have stopped the hunt at any time he 
wished, since the Delaware and Wyandot found it so easy to halt.143  This argument 
makes logical sense, but is rather weakly based on the assumption that Tecumseh did 
indeed have the power to bend his brother to his will.  The authority of the Wyandot chief 
did prevent any executions in his village, even after Tenskwatawa identified the 
“witches.”  In the Delaware village, one bold young man halted the executions by 
bringing his fellow villagers back to reason.  Neither community openly defied 
Tenskwatawa, as Tecumseh would have had to do in order to force his brother to 
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completely stop the hunt.  Therefore, simply assuming Tecumseh had the same ability to 
halt the witch-hunts as the Wyandot and Delaware had done is a stretch. 
Those with an inclination to idealize Tecumseh as a man of nobility and 
scruples—such as Benjamin Drake—contend that he vehemently opposed the witch-hunt.  
Drake wrote, “We have met with no evidence that Tecumseh favored the destruction of 
the Delawares, whose unhappy fate has been detailed.  On the contrary, it is stated by a 
credible authority, [Anthony Shane—the son of a French-Canadian trader and a Shawnee 
woman—who idolized Tecumseh] that he was opposed to it”.144  Observing Tecumseh’s 
position against burning prisoners, one could conclude that it is quite likely that 
Tecumseh also opposed burning witches.  When he was young, as he watched warriors 
burn a prisoner of war for the first time, he reportedly felt extreme revulsion at such a 
practice.  According to Drake (1841), “After it was over, he expressed in strong terms, 
his abhorrence of the act, and it was finally concluded by the party that they would never 
burn any more prisoners; and to this resolution he himself, and the party also, it is 
believed, ever afterwards scrupulously adhered”.145  Drake, of course, had a great respect 
for Tecumseh as a mighty warrior, military leader, diplomat, and hero, and was probably 
inclined to believe the best about him.  His subsequent glorification of Tecumseh’s 
nobility, genius, independence, eloquence, and sense of justice only serves to testify in 
favor of Drake’s bias.  Gilbert, calling Drake and Shane apologists, believed that 
Tecumseh took a practical view of the witch-hunts—they set an example for those who 
were sympathetic to Americans.146 
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Barring exaggeration on the part of early historians, and the possibility that 
witches did not rate the same humane treatment as prisoners in Tecumseh’s eyes, one 
could reasonably conclude that Tecumseh would not have supported Tenskwatawa’s 
campaign.  Whether or not he actually opposed his brother and tried to put a stop to him 
is another matter—perhaps he respected the Prophet enough to leave him to his own 
devices.  Nevertheless, this unresolved disagreement between the two brothers implies 
that Tecumseh did not control Tenskwatawa, else he would have prevented the prophet 
from conducting witch hunts.  Thus, one must conclude that either Tecumseh believed in 
and supported his brother’s actions, or did not have the power to oppose him.  Either 
way, it would seem that Tecumseh did not control Tenskwatawa. 
During Tecumseh’s travels between 1803 and 1811, he addressed both American 
and Indian audiences from the Great Lakes to the Gulf coast regarding the atrocities 
committed upon the red man by the white.  As American settlers pushed beyond the 
boundaries established by the Greenville treaty, conflicts often sprang up between the 
two races.147  Tecumseh cried out against individual violence and racial mistreatment.  
He often pointed out the malicious nature of white men—who, he said, hungered for 
native hunting grounds.  A report (attributed to General Sam Dale, a frontiersman, and 
dictated at an unspecified date) of Tecumseh’s 1811 speech to the Creek provides an 
example of this.  The witness wrote this version because, as he said, “His speech has been 
reported, but no one has done or can do it justice.  I think I can repeat the substance of 
what he said, and, indeed, his very words.”148  According to this report, Tecumseh said of 
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the white race, “They seize your land; they corrupt your women; they trample on the 
ashes of your dead.  Back, whence they came, upon a trail of blood, they must be 
driven…This is the will of the Great Spirit, revealed to my brother, his familiar, the 
Prophet of the Lakes.  He sends me to you.”149   
The Shawnee brothers’ aim was to push white settlers back to the Greenville 
boundary—in other words, to enforce the treaty where the United States would not.  
Thus, Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa adopted a more modest goal than that of Pontiac and 
Neolin.  Perhaps knowing that they had no hope of driving the Americans from the 
continent, they simply desired to halt the spread of westward settlers, to keep the west for 
Native Americans.  In order to accomplish their goal, they endeavored to unite the Indian 
tribes—to make them a single race instead of a group of separate nations.  Whereas 
Pontiac sent war belts to other nations to ask for their support as he attacked, the 
Shawnee brothers sought to forge unity before they started an all-out war.  As Tecumseh 
traveled, both with his brother and on his own, he gathered supporters for their cause.   
In 1805, about the same time that Lauliwethica became Tenskwatawa, the 
brothers and their followers settled at Greenville, at the insistence of the Prophet.  
Tenskwatawa claimed the Great Spirit instructed him to settle there to “receive and 
instruct all from the different tribes that were willing to be good”.150  By “good”, the 
Prophet meant willing to leave their “wicked” (unbelieving) chiefs and follow him 
instead.  This prerogative, of course, shows a degree of control on Tenskwatawa’s part, 
since his designs overrode those of this brother, who had planned to continue on to 
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Auglaize, where the two had been invited to settle with their followers.151  From 
Greenville, the brothers continued their campaign, each winning support for their cause in 
a different manner.  The community that Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa established here—
in symbolic defiance of the Treaty of Greenville—was a mixture of Indians from many 
different tribes.152  Thus their ideal nation, which transcended tribal identities, was 
becoming a reality. 
While Tenskwatawa focused his efforts on changing Indian society, Tecumseh 
was more willing to maintain diplomatic relations with America, at least at first, in order 
to achieve his goals.  This willingness to compromise can be related to the willingness of 
Pontiac (and likely Neolin) to maintain relations with the French—in fact, to seek to 
bring them back to power.  Perhaps all these men knew they could not succeed in a direct 
confrontation with the established power, and compromised accordingly.  Both brothers 
exchanged communications with William Henry Harrison, the governor of the Indiana 
territory.  Tecumseh, while usually civil to the governor, strongly believed that Harrison 
had illegitimately purchased the Indiana territory, since he bought it from small tribes 
who had questionable rights to the land to begin with.  An example of this comes to us 
through the historian Benjamin Drake, who drew information on an 1810 meeting 
between Harrison and Tecumseh from a family letter written by Captain G.R. Floyd, who 
was present at the meeting.  According to Drake,  
Tecumseh opened the meeting by stating, at length, his objections to the treaty of 
fort Wayne153, made by governor Harrison in the previous year; and in the course 
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of his speech, boldly avowed the principle of his party to be, that of resistance to 
every cession of land, unless made by all the tribes, who, he contended, formed 
but one nation.154 
 
This became a reoccurring theme in Tecumseh’s speeches—only the Indian nation as a 
whole, he said, should have the right to bargain away land that belonged to everyone. 
Harrison did his best to dissuade Indians from following the Prophet or joining 
Tecumseh’s nation.  According to historian Moses Dawson (1824), whose account cites 
the original document, in 1807 Harrison sent a speech to the Shawnees, delivered by John 
Conner, an American Indian agent.  In it he pleads: “My children, this business must be 
stopped.  You have called in a number of men from the most distant tribes, to listen to a 
fool, who speaks not the words of the Great Spirit, but those of the devil, and of the 
British agents”.155  The United States feared that Tenskwatawa worked with the British in 
an anti-American conspiracy—Jefferson reminisced to Adams in 1812, “We let him 
[Tenskwatawa] go on…unmolested.  But his followers increased until the British thought 
him worth corrupting, and found him corruptible.”156  It is interesting to note that he goes 
on to say that after this he left the administration, and was never “informed what were the 
particular acts on his part, which produced an actual commencement of hostilities on 
ours.”157  The Shawnee brothers, in fact, did nothing to commence hostilities. 
In 1807 Harrison demanded that the brothers and their 400 or so followers remove 
themselves from his territory and relocate beyond the boundary established by the treaty 
of Greenville.  The United States feared that the Indians had gathered together in 
                                                                                                                                            
settlment according to the terms of the treaty of Greenville—to the United States.  This caused a great deal 
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preparation for war.  Contrary to his intent, Harrison’s diplomacy caused a stir and more 
natives moved to Greenville in defiance of the governor and in support of Tecumseh, 
bringing their numbers to 700 or 800 by the end of the summer.158 
In 1808, after Greenville’s resources could no longer support the growing 
community, Tecumseh, Tenskwatawa, and their followers relocated to the banks of the 
Tippecanoe, on territory granted to them by the Potawatamies and Kickapos.159  From a 
settlement popularly known as Prophet’s Town, the brothers attracted more followers to 
their union.  Many historians contend that Tecumseh now used his brother to validate his 
own plans.  For example, Reed Beard (1889) wrote, “The Prophet and his superstitious 
religion were used as tools by Tecumseh.  Although The Prophet appeared for some time 
the greater, his popularity was made to serve the ambitious political purposes of his 
intellectual and sagacious brother”.160  Beard, of course, credited Tecumseh for being the 
brains of the operation.  He chose not to believe that a superstitious man such as 
Tenskwatawa could also be as successful a negotiator as his brother, who was more 
socially acceptable in the context of Beard’s white culture.   
Some historians credit Tenskwatawa with being the first to speak of a united 
Indian nation.  Beard asserts that not only did Tecumseh devise this enterprise, but he 
also developed the religious movement that went along with it: “The idea of ruling the 
Indians by a supposed mediation between them and God, in all probability had its origin 
in Tecumseh’s fertile mind”.161  Drake (1841), on the other hand, implies that, if 
anything, this relationship described by Beard was reversed: “The sacred office which the 
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Prophet had impiously assumed, enabled him to sway many minds, and in doing so, he 
was effectively sustained by the personal presence, tact, and sagacity of his brother”.162  
Rather than being Tecumseh’s puppet the Prophet utilized his brother’s skills in order to 
supplement his own powerful attributes. 
Nevertheless, Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa were both aware of Pontiac’s uprising, 
and knew that they followed in the footsteps of others.  According to Parkman, Tecumseh 
“adopted him [Pontiac] for his model, proving himself no unworthy imitator.”163  
According to a letter Harrison sent to the Secretary of War, Tenskwatawa also “boasted 
that he would follow in the footsteps of the Great Pontiac.”164  Dowd (1992) argued that 
Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa’s movement drew on a legacy of ideas dating back to the 
1740s—other prophets, other attempts at unity, and other hopes of recapturing the sacred 
power lost after contact with Europeans.   
Like Pontiac and Neolin, the Shawnee brothers did not achieve their goals.  A 
great loss of the Prophet’s power—though not Tecumseh’s, at least not entirely—came 
with the battle of Tippecanoe.  Tecumseh left the settlement—taking warriors with him 
and leaving Tenskwatawa with a skeletal force—to speak to the southern tribes.  
Believing that he planned on being absent for only three months, Harrison acted quickly 
to destroy Prophet’s Town, ostensibly to protect the white settlers from “the murderous 
depredations of the Indians”.165  He marched toward the settlement with about 910 
soldiers.166  Before dawn on November 6, 1811, the remaining Indians at Tippecanoe, 
believing themselves to be invincible under Tenskwatawa’s spiritual protection, attacked 
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the American army, which was encamped within a mile of the town.  Tenskwatawa had 
said to them, “They [the Americans] sleep now, and will never awake.  The Great Spirit 
will give light to us, and darkness to the white men.  Their bullets shall not harm us; your 
weapons shall always be fatal”.167  Despite the Prophet’s promise, many warriors died 
during the battle.  While the battle itself was not decisive, and it did not decimate the 
Native American army, Tenskwatawa’s failure to deliver victory to the Indians meant 
that the Americans won by default, since his followers lost faith in his promises. 
The Prophet’s authority all but vanished.  Beard wrote, “The battle of Tippecanoe 
was fought contrary to the orders of Tecumseh, who, when he returned from the South 
with his confederacy completed, found that all had been ruined by the folly of his 
brother”.168  This is an exaggeration—Tecumseh’s confederacy was hardly completed, 
and fault for the loss at Tippecanoe could not be placed solely on Tenskwatawa’s 
shoulders.  Furthermore, while Tecumseh wished to avoid (or at least postpone) outright 
conflict with the United States, defending the town against an American attack probably 
didn’t refute his orders.  Nevertheless, only two days after the battle the Americans found 
Prophet’s Town completely deserted, save one chief with a broken leg.  The American 
army destroyed the town and the supplies that remained in it.169 
Later that year Harrison reported to the war department that the two principal 
chiefs of the Kickapoos parleyed with him and informed him that “the whole of the tribes 
who lost warriors in the late action, attribute their misfortune to the Prophet alone; that 
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they constantly reproach him with their misfortunes, and threaten him with death”.170  
Many historians (Drake and Gilbert, for example), basing their reports on that of Anthony 
Shane, maintain that even Tecumseh threatened to kill Tenskwatawa for his folly.171  
Whatever words passed between the brothers, the Prophet lost his credibility at 
Tippecanoe, as did Tecumseh to some extent.  Not completely abandoned by his 
followers, Tenskwatawa resided among various tribes and eventually crossed to lands 
west of the Mississippi, where most of the Kispoko Shawnee had migrated by the time he 
first had his vision in 1805.172  There, he lived out the rest of his days as chief of a small 
Shawnee village.173 
Thus far, Tecumseh’s efforts to build his confederacy had been promising.  It is 
possible that he could have made similar progress even without the support in his brother.  
Complete loss of faith in Tenskwatawa, however, combined with a loss of faith in what 
united tribes could do against the Americans, led many tribes to rethink their commitment 
to the pan-Indian union and reconsider the benefits of friendly relations with the United 
States.  Tecumseh continued his efforts to build his confederacy.  A British officer 
reported to his General in 1812, “The Prophet and his people do not appear as a 
vanquished enemy; they re-occupy their former ground”.174  Indeed they were not 
vanquished, but any confidence their followers had in their ability to defeat the United 
States in battle had been shattered.  The Prophet’s powers had failed.  Tecumseh, while 
moderately successful at keeping the tribes of his confederacy together, could no longer 
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retain authority as a leader of the consolidated nation.  Without the influence of a 
religious figurehead, what he arranged was merely an alliance between chiefs.  Tecumseh 
eventually allied himself with the British army, and fought against America until he died 
in battle in the War of 1812.175  While he continued to distinguish himself as a warrior, he 
no longer had any hope of forging a united Indian nation. 
As for the battle of Tippecanoe, in all likelihood, if Tecumseh and his forces had 
been present, Harrison would not have attacked—the General simply saw and exploited 
the weakness that the warriors left in his absence.  Nevertheless, had Tecumseh been 
there, his diplomacy skills—or his military forces, as a last resort—might have saved the 
day and preserved the confederacy.  The battle of Tippecanoe proved that neither brother 
could succeed without the skills and support of the other.  Furthermore, barring insanity, 
if Tenskwatawa had been a puppet or a fraud, he would not have promised invincibility to 
his warriors.  This promise would make absolutely no logical sense unless he believed 
it—for surely he knew that even if his warriors emerged victorious, some must die, thus 
invalidating his power and discrediting him almost as much as losing would have.  Far 
from foolish, Tenskwatawa surely believed his own words as he promised that American 
guns would not harm his warriors.  Had the Prophet been a fraud, he would have made a 
promise wrapped in obscurity, one less readily disproved—perhaps promising victory but 
not invincibility.  Had he been his brother’s puppet, he would never have taken it upon 
himself to attack the Americans against Tecumseh’s wishes. 
Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa had a reciprocal relationship.  Each benefited from 
the other’s authority in his particular sphere.  If either had thoughts of dominating the 
other he was unsuccessful, as each maintained such a degree of independence that he was 
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sovereign in his own realm.  Nevertheless, they relied on each other—Tenskwatawa 
would have needed his brother’s military leadership in order to have a chance at success 
at the battle of Tippecanoe, and Tecumseh could not remain the head of his confederacy 
without his brother’s religious backing.  Only when the brothers were separated did their 
powers fail. 
Early historians tended to focus on military leaders such as Pontiac and Tecumseh 
rather than on religious figureheads such as Neolin and Tenkswatawa.  They did so with 
purpose—they did not credit prophets as leaders but saw them as psychopaths.  
Furthermore, white historians who wanted to tell an exciting story often preferred the 
military leaders because it is in their campaigns one finds the action that appeals to white 
audiences.  It is an exciting story to tell.  The stories of the prophets, by contrast, seem 
relatively more mythic, less relevant, and less comprehensible to non-believers. 
Despite this viewpoint, one does not need to ascribe to the truth of the prophet’s 
messages in order to recognize their importance.  The relevant fact is that they were 
believed—many American Indians, including Pontiac and Tecumseh, believed in the 
validity, the sheer relevancy, of the prophets’ visions, and it is because of this that there is 
“action” to speak of—the prophets were catalysts for the nativist movements that grew up 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.   
The prophets’ messages were not simply moral injunctions.  Although both men 
attempted to rectify evils they saw in society, they also addressed “mundane” issues such 
as game scarcity, invasion of Native American land, and economic dependence on 
European and American trade and goods.  Thus, the prophets sought to remedy not only 
society’s evils but also its troubles.  What White wrote about Tenskwatawa applies to 
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Neolin as well: “Tenskwatawa constructed a social and theological response to the 
conditions of the border villages.”176  Both prophets preached in response to the social 
conditions they faced.  This is no coincidence; the sociologist Bernard Barber, in his 1941 
article “Acculturation and Messianic Movements,” asserted that “The general 
sociocultural situation that precipitates a messianic movement…[is characterized by] the 
widespread experience of ‘deprivation’—the despair caused by inability to obtain what 
the culture has defined as the ordinary satisfactions of life.”177  This meant, first, that 
Neolin and Tenskwatawa sought to remedy social problems.  Second, as both were 
affected by their environment—a blend of native and white culture—both combined 
traditional and Christian elements in what they preached. 
Thus, the prophets’ messages, tailored to be relevant to the social situation at the 
time, attempted to change the situation.  One way to go about this was to make people 
recognize their real problems and how to solve them.  For example, Tenskwatawa wanted 
to address the problem of drunkenness.  He described the place where drunkards went 
when they died, and then called for people to abstain entirely from intoxicants, lest they 
suffer thusly in the afterlife.  His proscription against trade with the United States helped 
enforce this, as well as reducing the influence that American culture had on his people.   
Another way of changing the social situation was inducing war leaders such as 
Pontiac and Tecumseh to put forth a military effort.  Thus, the relationship between the 
religious figureheads, Neolin and Tenskwatawa, and the war leaders, Pontiac and 
Tecumseh, was symbiotic.  Neolin and Tenskwatawa used the war leaders to effect the 
social changes desired by both parties, while Pontaic and Tecumseh used the nativism of 
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